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The aim of this paper is to cast some light on the circumstances
in which one’s finding something just obvious is an epistemically
acceptable belief-state, perhaps a state of knowledge, even when the
believer is unable to justify the belief. Using Peacocke’s theory of
concepts, I will argue that the relevant belief-state can result from
the activation of reliable belief-forming dispositions which are due
to the possession of certain concepts. The strategy is to concentrate
on belief in a simple truth of Euclidean plane geometry and then
to consider general implications. The layout of this paper between
introduction and conclusion is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set out
the conceptual apparatus; section 4 uses the apparatus to explain
the belief; section 5 concerns the epistemic appraisal of the belief;
section 6 addresses the main Quinean objection.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Recall how Meno’s slave is led by Socrates’s questioning to see that
the square on the diagonal of a given square has double the area of
the given square.2 Crucially, the questioning alludes to a diagram
(Figure 1).
Of course, the questioning is not about the diagram, but about all
geometrical squares arranged as the rough squares in the diagram.
When Socrates’s asks “Is this figure here equal to that?” indicating
regions in the diagram, he is not asking the slave to read off a
geometrical equality or inequality from his perceptual knowledge of
the actual regions indicated. It would not matter if the actual regions
were visibly unequal in shape and areas: Socrates’s question might
still be correctly answered in the affirmative. Whatever might be
going on in a case like this, it is not a matter of empirical discovery,
not knowledge by generalisation from the evidence of the senses.3
Philosophical Studies 92: 181–204, 1998.
c
 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
182 M. GIAQUINTO
Figure 1.
Something more interesting is going on. Leaving aside the question
of what exactly does go on when one makes a discovery this way,
let us just note that when the final figure is before us, a simple
move convinces us that the square on the diagonal does indeed have
double the area of the original square: we count the basic triangles,
the triangles congruent to the two in the original (horizontal-vertical
sided) square either side of the indicated diagonal. Two compose the
original square and four the square on the diagonal; four is double
two; so : : :
This little piece of counting and reasoning is fine. But it yields the
conclusion (that the square on the diagonal has double the area of the
original square) only on the assumption that the triangles counted
are themselves all of the same area. How do you know this? What
makes you think it so? Part of the answer is that you believe that in
a Euclidean plane4 the triangles in a square either side of a diagonal
are the same in area. Call that proposition .
[] The triangles formed from the sides and one diagonal of
a square have the same area.
Why do you believe ? If you are careful you might say something
like this: ‘The diagonal bisects the angles of the square at the corners
through which it passes; the halves of each bisected angle belong
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one to each triangle; so the triangles are equal with respect to the
size of an angle (half of one of the bisected angles), the length of an
adjacent side (the diagonal), and the size of an adjacent angle (half
of the other bisected angle); triangles which are equal with respect
to angle-side-angle are congruent; so the two triangles are the same
in area.’
Responses like this are sound. But they are implausible as answers
to the question asked (Why do you believe ?) when this is a request
for an explanation of your believing something, as here, rather than
a request for a justification for believing it. Sometimes one believes
a proposition because one has accepted an argument for it, in which
case giving the argument might be a way of both explaining and
justifying one’s believing the proposition. But the answer I have
suggested is unlikely to be the whole explanation of your belief in .
The focus of concern here is a belief state rather than the proposition
believed. My belief state is such that proposition  seems immedi-
ately and clearly true, i.e. obvious.5 I assume that this is so for you
as well. Now, if you were to believe  only because you accepted
the argument suggested, then  would not seem immediately and
clearly true; for (a) your recognising that  is true would be medi-
ated by your recognition of the soundness of the argument, and (b)
 would seem no clearer than the argument’s least clear premiss,
i.e. that triangles which have an angle-side-angle of equal size are
congruent; but that premiss is surely not as clear as . That is why
I think that your acceptance of an argument like this is unlikely to
be the whole explanation of your believing , assuming you find 
obvious.
Even if you do not find  simply obvious but believe  only
because of your acceptance of some argument, you will almost
certainly have some belief in a proposition which strikes you as
obvious, which you do not believe as a result of inference. So the
questions that arise for most people over belief in  will arise for
you over some other belief, if not . What are these questions? First,
there is a question of explanation:
How can we explain one’s believing  in a way which
accommodates the datum that  seems obvious to the
believer?
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Secondly, there is an epistemological question:
How are we to appraise the belief state epistemically?
(Could it be knowledge?)
I link the explanatory question with the normative question
because I think that an answer to the first might help us find an
answer to the second. But why should we be concerned with the
epistemology of this somewhat trivial geometrical truth? The funda-
mental concern here is the epistemology of the obvious. This is
a non-trivial matter. All inferential knowledge must rest on some
un-inferred beliefs; some of these may be perceptual beliefs, but
others will be non-perceptual beliefs in propositions which, the
believer feels, are just obvious. Their seeming obvious is not a
guarantee of epistemic acceptability, for some propositions which
once seemed obvious later turned out to be dubious if not false, e.g.
Every event has a cause.
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line.
The extension of any mathematical predicate is a set.
When belief in the seemingly obvious is epistemically acceptable,
what features of it make it acceptable? What distinguishes the accept-
able from the unacceptable instances of the seemingly obvious?
These are the general questions which motivate our particular inves-
tigation into the nature and epistemology of our belief in .
2. A PERCEPTUAL CONCEPT FOR SQUARES
My aim is to find answers to the two questions in terms of our
possessing certain concepts. The two questions, recall, are:
How can we explain our believing  and its seeming obvious to us?
What is the epistemic status of our belief in ?
The idea is that our believing  issues in a fairly direct way from our
possessing certain concepts; and that this both explains ’s seem-
ing obvious and makes our believing  epistemically acceptable.
The central concept for our purposes is a geometrical concept for
squares. How to specify geometrical concepts is not at all straight-
forward. My guess is that we first acquire perceptual shape concepts
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and then derive geometrical concepts from the perceptual. Plato
would disagree. Nonetheless, we will follow the conjectured order
of acquisition: first specify a perceptual concept and then see if we
can find our way to a geometrical concept from there. A convincing
account of a perceptual concept for squares has been worked out
by Peacocke.6 I will now present that account, with an abbreviated
explanation of the point of its various parts. Those familiar with this
work should skip to the next section.
Let us accept that there is nothing more to a concept than what is
determined by a correct account of what it is to possess the concept. In
short, a concept’s identity is determined by its possession-condition.
Then we can specify a concept by giving its possession condition:
The perceptual concept hsquarei is that concept C to
possess which it is necessary and sufficient that : : :C : : :
where the open clause is some condition on the thinker involving C.
As a first shot we might start to fill out the open clause by saying
the thinker will believe of any object presented under
perceptual-demonstrative mode m that C(m), whenever
the object of m appears square to her : : :
This is inadequate because we have not made it clear how something
can appear square to a person without that person having the percep-
tual thought that it is square, hence possessing a concept for squares.
Thus there is a danger that the account of the condition for possessing
a concept would include possessing that very concept! Clearly no
concept could be individuated that way. This does not mean that we
cannot use the concept hsquarei in specifying its possession condi-
tion; but it does mean that we cannot attribute possession of the
concept to the thinker in specifying its possession condition. What
is needed is an account of ‘x appears square to y’ which does not
itself require that y has the concept we are attempting to specify.
Scenario Content
For this purpose we need to say what it is for something to appear
square to a person in terms of the non-conceptual content of experi-
ence.7 We shall use Peacocke’s account of the non-conceptual
contents of perceptual experience.8 There are two components,
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scenario content and aspectual content. A scenario is a way in which
perceptible features might be distributed in the space around the
perceiver. Locations are given in terms of direction and distance from
the perceiver. (The centre of the chest may serve as point of origin
and lines through the origin in the directions up/down, left/right and
front/back for the perceiver may serve as axes.) For each egocentri-
cally given location the presence or absence of an edge or surface
is given, its orientation (if present), together with perceptible quali-
ties of colour, texture, hardness, temperature, and much else. One’s
experience may represent such a possible distribution of perceptible
features around the perceiver – a scenario. This is a kind of content
because it may be correct or incorrect: it is correct when the actual
distribution of perceptible features around the perceiver instantiates
the type of distribution of perceptible features which constitutes the
scenario. Note that a scenario must not be confused with descrip-
tions of it; in describing a scenario we are free to use any concepts
we want; scenario-content is non-conceptual, but a description of
scenario-content must employ concepts.
Now we can avoid the threat of circularity in specifying the condi-
tion for possessing the perceptual concept hsquarei. For we can
replace
the thinker will believe of any object presented under
perceptual-demonstrative mode m that C(m), whenever
the object presented under m appears square to her : : :
by
the thinker will believe of any object presented under
perceptual-demonstrative mode m, that C(m), when the
object presented under m occupies a square region of
the scenario that the thinker’s experience represents as
instantiated around her : : :
Possessing a concept for squares, you may reject the thought that
the object is square, even when it is apparently square to you in
the sense just given, if you take your experience to be illusory. To
accommodate this we simply add
and the thinker takes her experience at face value.
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Aspectual Content
Someone who has a concept for squares who perceives a square floor
tile and who takes her experience at face value need not think that the
tile is square if she perceives it in the diamond orientation. In such
a case the tile does occupy a square region of the scenario that the
experience represents as instantiated around her. So the condition is
not as it stands a necessary condition for possessing a concept for
squares.
When something is perceived as a diamond, one perceives a
symmetry about its angle bisectors.9 When something is perceived
as a square, one perceives a symmetry about the bisectors of its sides.
There is evidence that symmetries can be perceived without having
a concept for symmetry.10 Perceived symmetries, then, can belong
to the non-conceptual content of experience. However, a scenario in
which something occupies a square region will contain symmetries
about both the angle bisectors and side bisectors; so an experience
of a square in which only the angle bisectors are perceived, i.e. the
shape appears as a diamond but not as a square, and an experience
which differs only in that the side bisectors are perceived instead
of the angle bisectors, will have the same scenario content. This
difference has to belong to another component of non-conceptual
content, which we might call aspect.11
The upshot for us is that in order to get a necessary condition we
must take into account the possibility of perceiving a square region
as a diamond but not a square; we should only expect a possessor
of the concept to judge perceptually that a thing is square when
she perceives it as having equal sides and as symmetrical about the
bisectors of its sides. Thus we get the condition
the thinker will believe of any object presented under
perceptual-demonstrative mode m that C(m), whenever
the object presented under m occupies a square region
of the scenario that the thinker’s experience represents as
instantiated around her, and she experiences that region as
having equal sides and as symmetrical about the bisectors
of its sides, and she takes her experience at face value.
This does seem to be necessary for possessing a perceptual concept
of square. But it is not in fact sufficient, because it does not take
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into account the possibility of judging something unperceived to be
square. So we need to add another clause:
for an object thought about under some other mode n, the
thinker will believe C(n) just when she accepts that the
object presented under n has the same shape as others she
has experienced, where that is the shape perceptual expe-
riences of the kind mentioned in the first clause represent
objects as having.
If we conjoin these clauses, the result is a condition which is both
necessary and sufficient for possessing a perceptual concept for
squares. I will call this concept: hsquarei.
3. A GEOMETRICAL CONCEPT FOR SQUARES
The Concept hPerfect Squarei
The perceptual concept hsquarei is a vague concept, that is, there
may be things for which it is neither true nor false that they fall
under the concept. Soho Square is square and Gordon Square is
clearly not, but Russell Square is in the twilight zone. Among things
which are clearly square, such as a floor tile or a CD case, we can
sometimes see one as a better square than another – edges sharper,
straighter or closer in length, corners more exactly rectangular and
so on. Sometimes we can see a square, one drawn by hand for
instance, as one which could be improved on and we can imagine
a change which would result in a better square. This relation, the
better square than relation, partially orders its relata – two squares
may be incomparable – and its extension would be vague.
It can be part of the content of an experience of those having
the concept hsquarei that one square is better than the other. It can
also be part of the content of experience that a square is perfect.
Since there is a finite limit to the acuity of perceptual experience,
there must be maximally square regions of a scenario; it is beyond
our powers to experience better squares than these as better. Parallel
points apply for the non-conceptual experience of symmetry and
equality of length. There are lower limits on perceptible asymmetry
and perceptible differences of length i.e. asymmetry about an axis
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or difference in length which is so slight that it falls below the lower
limit will be imperceptible; so there is maximum perceptual acuity
for symmetry and equality of length. This means that there is a
maximum degree to which a region of a scenario can be symme-
trical about a given axis, and a maximum degree to which two
edges in a scenario can be equal in length. When in an experi-
ence in which an object appears square12 these maxima are reached,
the object will be experienced as having perfectly sharp, perfectly
straight edges, with absolutely no asymmetry about their bisectors
and absolutely no inequality of length. In other words the objects will
appear perfectly square.13 Note that this allows that one can judge
of something which appears perfectly square that it is not. Now we
can say:
The concept hperfect squarei is that concept C to possess
which it is necessary and sufficient that for any plane
figure y, when y appears perfectly square to the thinker,
[a] if she were to judge, of a plane figure x, that x has
 (where  is the shape y appears to her to have), she
would find it primitively compelling14 that C(x), and [b]
if she were to judge that C(x), she would find it primitively
compelling that x has .
No doubt there are other more sophisticated concepts expressed by
the word “square” which qualify as geometrical concepts. But this
works for basic geometrical knowledge.
If one has the propensity to find it compelling, for any x, that Gx,
given that Fx, I take it that one would also find compelling the valid-
ity of the inference form ‘Fx; so Gx’, provided that one can represent
this form. This in turn would make it compelling that every F is G,
provided that one has a concept of restricted universal quantification.
In what follows I assume that you satisfy these conditions for gener-
alizing, i.e. that you can represent to yourself the relevant inference
forms and that you have a concept of restricted universal quantifi-
cation. Now suppose that an object y appears perfectly square to
you and that you have the concept hperfect squarei. Then (calling
the apparent shape of y “”) your believing of something that it
has  will compel you to believe, without intervening reasons, that
it is perfectly square; and your believing that it is perfectly square
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will compel you to believe, without intervening reasons, that it is of
shape . As you satisfy the conditions for generalizing, this means
that you have the following belief-forming disposition:
(Sq) If something were to appear perfectly square to you, you
would believe of its apparent shape  that whatever has 
is perfectly square, and that whatever is perfectly square
has shape , without intervening reasons.
Symmetry
Let x and y be two plane figures having the same shape but differing
in position, size, orientation, sense or some combination thereof.
Then for any line (straight line segment) through x there is a corre-
sponding line through y. What is correspondence here? Imagine
y contracting or expanding uniformly until it is congruent with x;
then imagine the contracted or expanded version of y moving so
as to coincide with x. A transformation of this kind maps each line
through y onto a line through x. So we can say: a line s through x
corresponds to a line t through y if and only if such a transformation
maps t onto s.
Now suppose you perceive a plane figure y as symmetrical about
a line t through y, at a non-conceptual level. Let ‘’ denote that shape
which y appears to you to have and let us take it that you have relevant
concepts of same shape, same size and corresponds to. Then, for any
figure x you take to have , you will find it primitively compelling
that for some line s through x which would correspond to t through
y were y as it appears, the parts of x either side of s are the same
in size and shape. If in addition you satisfy the conditions which,
from a disposition to find transitions of a certain form compelling,
brings a correlative general belief, you will be convinced that for
any x having  and any line s through x which would correspond
to t through y were y as it appears, the parts of x either side of s
are the same in shape and size. The belief is immediate because
acceptance of it does not depend on reasons. Thus a possessor of the
relevant concepts who satisfies the generalizing conditions will have
the following belief-forming disposition:
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(Sym) If a plane figure y were to appear to one perfectly symme-
trical about a line t, one would believe that for any x
having  (that shape y appears to have) and for any line s
through x which would correspond to t through y were y
as it appears, the parts of x either side of s are exactly the
same in shape and size, without intervening reasons.
In what follows I restrict attention to thinkers who possess the rele-
vant geometrical concepts and have the belief-forming dispositions
designated (sq) and (sym). I also assume that the thinkers have con-
cepts for perfect triangles and for diagonals.
4. EXPLAINING THE BELIEF STATE
Seeing Squares as Square Diamonds
Whether one perceives a square merely as a square or merely as a
diamond or as both depends on which symmetries are perceived. A
square figure drawn with a horizontal base on an otherwise blank
surface will be perceived as a square but may not be perceived as
a diamond, because this orientation usually causes the symmetries
about the edge bisectors to be perceived, but not the symmetries
about the angle bisectors. If a square is drawn on an otherwise blank
surface standing on one of its corners, its sides at 45 degrees to the
horizontal, the symmetries about the angle bisectors will normally
be perceived, whereas the symmetries about the side bisectors may
not. But in certain perceptible contexts or ‘frames’, squares at 45
degrees will be perceived as squares, because those contexts will
cause us to perceive the symmetries about the edge bisectors.15
What happens if we first draw a square in the 45 degree position
on an otherwise blank surface and then draw a frame around it at
the same angle, as in Figure 2 read left to right? What may well
happen is that something we see first see as symmetrical about its
angle bisectors we come to see as also symmetrical about its edge
bisectors and so as a square symmetrical about its angle bisectors.
Or suppose we first see a square figure with a horizontal base on a
blank surface. If we then draw a rectangular frame around it at 45
degrees, we may again come to see it as a square symmetrical about
its angle bisectors. And I think the same can happen if we draw one
192 M. GIAQUINTO
Figure 2.
of the diagonals of a horizontal square. In each of these three ways
we can come to see a figure as a square symmetrical about its angle
bisectors.
Since a diagonal is just that part of an angle bisector not external
to the square, seeing something as a square symmetrical about its
angle bisectors entails seeing it as a square symmetrical about its
diagonals, possibly at the non-conceptual level of aspect perception.
Again, seeing a figure as symmetrical about some axis is to see
the parts of the figure either side of the axis as congruent, as the
same in shape and size. So these ways of seeing something as a
square symmetrical about its angle bisectors are ways of seeing it
as a square whose parts either side of a diagonal have the same
area. These remarks continue to hold for experiences in which the
squares appear perfectly square, the symmetries appear perfect and
the equalities of size and shape appear exact.
Effects of these Perceptions
Suppose that you possess the concept hperfect squarei specified
earlier, as well as relevant concepts16 for (perfect) sameness of
size, line-correspondence, diagonals and triangles, and the minimal
awareness that brings the belief-forming dispositions, such as (Sq)
and (Sym). Suppose that while in this state you have a perceptual
experience of one of the kinds just described, so that you perceived
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some figure F as a perfect square perfectly symmetrical about its
diagonals. Then, calling the shape that F appears to have ‘’, the
experience will cause you to believe this:
[1] Whatever has  is perfectly square and whatever is
perfectly square has .
The experience will cause you to believe this because you have the
belief-forming disposition (Sq). As you also have the belief-forming
disposition (Sym), you will be caused by the experience to believe
this:
[2] For any x having  and any line s through x which would
correspond to a diagonal of F if F were as it appears, the
parts of x either side of s are perfectly equal in size.
But if these belief-forming dispositions are activated simultaneously
by the same sense experience, one could be caused to believe, with-
out active inference from [1] and [2], that
[3] For any perfect square x and any line s through x which
would correspond to a diagonal of F if F were as it appears,
the parts of x either side of s are exactly the same in size.
How is this possible? Let us distinguish between a belief state
(believing that ), the content of a belief state (the thought that
), and a mental occurrence in which that thought is represented as
true (thinking ). Occurent thinking does not entail that one articu-
lates the thought, but it does mean that there is some mental episode
which is a thinking of that thought. Sometimes one acquires a belief
without thinking it. Sometimes, however, one acquires a belief in
being caused to think it. The type of visual experience described
earlier can cause one to think [1] and [2], and as one has dispositions
(Sq) and (Sym) one will be caused to think them with belief. Think-
ing [1] and [2] with belief will cause one to think [3]. This is because
believing [1] includes a disposition to move in thought between ‘hav-
ing ’ and ‘being perfectly square’ whenever one thinks a thought
containing one of these and the other has been recently brought to
mind – [2] contains the former and the occurrence of [1] brings
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the latter to mind. So this is how the experience can lead one to
think [3]. This is different from active inference in the sense that the
thinker does not direct attention to the logic of [1] and [2] and apply
some rules or patterns of inference. One could reach [3] from [1]





Nothing of this sort is going on in the kind of process described
above. Instead there is a cascade of disposition activations initiated
by the perceptual experience and ending with belief [3].
In just the same way the experience could cause someone who
thinks [3] and has a concept for diagonals to think
[4] For any x having  and any diagonal s of x, the parts of x
either side of s are perfectly equal in size.
This is because, when you perceive F as a perfect square perfectly
symmetrical about its diagonals, you will find it immediate that a line
through a perfect square x is a diagonal of x if it would correspond
to a diagonal of F were F as it appears, given that you possess a
concept for diagonals.
Again, if you possess a concept for perfect triangles as well, you
will find it immediate that the parts either side of a diagonal of a
perfect square are perfect triangles; and again I suggest that if the
disposition which would produce this belief is activated by the same
perceptual experience, one would be caused to believe without active
inference
[5] The perfect triangles either side of a diagonal of a perfect
square are exactly the same in size.
Thus you will be caused to believe proposition , or if you believed
it already, that belief will be reinforced in you. One possible expla-
nation, then, of one’s having that belief is this: one has had an
experience of the kind described one or more times while possessing
(a) the constituent concepts of the belief and (b) a propensity to con-
vert an inferential disposition into a corresponding general belief.
Of course this is an explanation of a weak kind, it needs elaborating;
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in particular one wants to have a clearer idea of the mechanism of
automatic synthesis which results in beliefs normally reached step
by deliberate step.
There are other possible explanations and it is likely that a variety
of explanations are correct for different believers. A closely related
possibility is one in which the triggering experience is of the kind
described except that the figure is seen as a square but not a perfect
square. In this case I suspect that one can again be caused to believe ,
but the route goes through visual imagination: perceiving the figure
as a square symmetrical about its diagonals causes one to imagine a
perfect square as perfect symmetrical about its diagnosis.17 Thence
the causal path is parallel to the one given. This may in fact be more
common, though harder to investigate. But we confine our attention
to the original possibility.
Obviousness
In the account just given, the believer did not make inferences;18
in particular,  was not inferred from other beliefs. Rather, certain
belief-forming dispositions were activated in the thinker, and this
resulted in new beliefs or strengthening of existing beliefs. Here
I am supposing that when an experience triggers several belief-
forming dispositions, certain links are made in the thinker (not by
the thinker), resulting in the novel belief. We sometimes get a sense
of this when, as we say, things suddenly ‘fall into place’, when we
experience the ‘Aha!’ phenomenon. We seem to see the light all of
a sudden, without any effort.
This kind of occurrence, I conjecture, can also produce a sense of
obviousness. This I take to consist in a sense of immediacy, lucidity
and certainty. In the case under discussion, the accompanying sense
of immediacy results from the rapidity of the cascade of disposition
activations and the total absence of inferences. No inferences mediate
the relevant experiences and the acquisition of belief. In particular,
those experiences are not taken by the perceiver as evidential data
from which a conclusion is drawn. Rather, the experiences cause the
belief, by activating certain belief-forming dispositions.
The sense of lucidity may result from the vividness, sharpness
and stability of the experience which activates the belief-forming
dispositions. The strength of these dispositions, which may depend
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on how frequently and how recently one has used the constituent
concepts, may produce the sense of certainty. These considerations
make it plausible that the explanation of belief given here can be
elaborated to provide a full explanation of the accompanying sense
of obviousness.
5. EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL
What about the epistemological question? How should we appraise a
state of believing  generated in the way described? I will argue that
this way of reaching the belief satisfies a combination of externalist
and internalist conditions which, on my view, yield knowledge. Even
if fulfilling these conditions is not enough for knowledge, beliefs so
arrived at might still have an important epistemic status akin to
knowledge. This will be my assumption. The externalist condition
is one of reliability. We look at this first.
Reliability
Is the way in which the belief state was reached reliable? If it was
reached as described, it was the result of nothing but the activation
of a number of belief-forming dispositions. Those are the belief-
forming dispositions resulting from possession of the concepts which
are constituents of the thought . So the question is: Are those belief-
forming dispositions reliable?
A belief-forming disposition is reliable under this circumstance:
if the antecedent conditions were realised, the beliefs mentioned in
the consequent would be correct.19 Recall first the belief-forming
disposition that issues from possessing the concept hperfect squarei,
along with the ability to represent the inference types involved and
possession of a concept of restricted universal quantification:
(Sq) If something appears perfectly square to you, you will
believe of its apparent shape  that whatever has  is
perfectly square, and that whatever is perfectly square has
shape , without intervening reasons.
Recall that an object appears perfectly square to you when it appears
square to you (see note 12 for a reminder) and you experience it
as having perfectly sharp, perfectly straight edges, with absolutely
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no asymmetry about its edge bisectors and absolutely no inequality
of edge lengths. So if an object r appears perfectly square and an
object s actually is as r appears, s will actually be a square with
perfectly sharp perfectly straight edges of exactly the same length,
absolutely symmetrical about its edge bisectors. In other words s
will be perfectly square. So (Sq) is reliable in the sense given: the
beliefs mentioned in the consequent would be true if the antecedent
condition were realised. The other belief-forming disposition spelled
out earlier is
(Sym) If a plane figure y appears to one perfectly symmetrical
about a line t, one believes that for any x having  (the
shape y appears to have) and for any line s through x which
would correspond to t through y were y as it appears, the
parts of x either side of s are exactly the same in shape
and size, without intervening reasons.
Again, the reliability of this should not be hard to accept: when the
antecedent is fulfilled, the beliefs mentioned in the consequent have
got to be right. Finally, the reliability of the other belief-forming
dispositions involved in the route to , those resulting from addi-
tional possession of concepts for perfect triangles and diagonals, is
just a matter of checking. (I spare you the details. For the relevant
dispositions see note 16.) Given that the checks reveal nothing amiss
we have no reason to doubt the reliability of the described way of
reaching .
Justification
The internalist conditions are conditions of justification. There are
several grades of justification. A reliably acquired belief may be
justified at the lowest grade by satisfying certain weak coherence
constraints; the next grade up requires in addition that a fully explicit
account of the way in which the belief was acquired (or re-inforced)
could provide a justifying argument for the thought believed; a higher
grade still requires that the believer is actually able to articulate a
justifying argument.20 On my view of propositional knowledge, a
reliably acquired belief with the lowest grade of justification counts
as knowledge. But I contend that the second grade of justification is
achieved in this case.
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Let  be a belief acquired by means of reliable belief-forming
dispositions. Suppose one becomes aware of having beliefs incon-
sistent with  and of lacking grounds for greater confidence in 
than in the beliefs inconsistent with it. In this circumstance it would
be irrational to continue believing  (with full confidence). Another
such condition would be having a rational conscious (but false) belief
that the way in which  was acquired (and sustained) is unreliable.
There are probably many other defeaters, conditions under which
it would be irrational to come to believe a certain proposition or to
continue to do so, though that belief was acquired by reliable means.
A reliably acquired belief-state is justified (at the lowest grade) when
there are no defeaters.
There is no good reason to think that avoiding defeaters is impos-
sible or even difficult. The contrary thought probably results from
a mistaken view of rationality requirements. An example is the
common view that consistency of one’s belief set is required for
avoiding irrationality. (This is too harsh because it overlooks the
possibility of arriving at a number of jointly inconsistent beliefs, each
with high grade justification, when the inconsistency is extremely
difficult to detect. In this case the believer would be unlucky but not
necessarily irrational.) So it is possible, perhaps easy, to get a belief
by activation of a reliable belief-forming disposition and keep it, in
the absence of defeaters. Thus one may get belief  in a reliable way
and keep it without defeat. Such a belief state has the lowest grade
of justification, and on some views this already suffices for its being
a state of knowledge.
A higher grade of justification is achieved when, in addition,
an articulation of the way in which the belief was acquired (or re-
inforced) would constitute or contain a justifying argument for the
proposition believed. It seems plausible that this is true for  acquired
in the way described earlier. Substantiating this fully would take too
long, but part of the story given in section 4 supports the contention:
[1] and [2] entail [3]; [3] and a proposition about diagonals and a
proposition about the appearance of F jointly entail [4]; [4] and a
proposition about triangles and another proposition about the appear-
ance of F jointly entail [5]. The argument would of course have
premisses e.g. that inferences of certain types (those we find prim-
itively compelling in possessing a certain concept) are valid. These
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premisses and the inferential steps of the argument do not involve
anything contentious, to the best of my knowledge. It is plausible
then that an argument of this sort justifying  could be extracted from
a fully explicit account of the mode of belief-acquisition sketched
earlier.
To sum up this section: if one’s belief that  was acquired in
the way described, it was reliably acquired; it has a low grade of
justification provided that defeaters are absent; and it is plausible
that it has a further kind of justification as well. Thus the belief state
can have an epistemically valuable status, which on some views
qualifies as knowledge. In what follows I will assume that this status
makes a belief state epistemically acceptable.21
6. THE MAIN OBJECTION
If one first gets belief  in the manner described, the causes are
experiences with certain contents; but those experiences do not serve
as reasons or grounds for belief, because the believing does not
depend on the believer’s taking the experiences to be veridical. It
is enough that a figure F appear perfectly square to a possessor of
the concept hperfect squarei for her to believe that things shaped
as F appears to be are perfect squares. She does not also have to
take her experience of F to be veridical; she may on the contrary
believe like Plato that nothing perceptible is a perfect square. So
the experience does not furnish reasons or grounds for the belief.
The same applies mutatis mutandis for the role of the experience
of perceiving F as perfectly symmetrical about some line. Thus
this way of acquiring belief  is a priori, not in the sense that
the belief state was causally independent of experience, but in the
sense that no experience was used as grounds for the belief. In this
sense epistemically acceptable beliefs may be a priori. If epistemic
acceptability suffices for knowledge, there may be groundless a
priori knowledge. If this is not contentious enough we can go further.
Acquiring the belief  this way depends only on the activation of
dispositions which issue from possessing the constituent concepts
of ; we can therefore say that this is a conceptual belief which, if
knowledge, is conceptual knowledge.
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This will certainly meet resistance in some quarters: surely Quine
showed that there is no such thing as analytic knowledge, knowledge
by grasping the meanings of expressions, concepts or whatever? A
full review of Quine’s arguments would be out of place here, but let
us spell out the objection. Any sentence we take to be true22 might
come to be rationally rejected as false in the light of experience,
and there would be nothing which would make such an event a
mere change of language and not also a change of theory. This
applies to the sentence I used to express . It might get swept into
the bin of falsehood in a systematic revision of our assignment of
truth values to sentences in making best sense of experience. Thus
the acceptability of our currently assigning it truth does depend
on that assignment’s compatibility with a total assignment which
fits well with experience. In short, justifiably believing it depends
on experience. So, the objection runs, our coming to believe  in
manner described earlier does not result in a priori knowledge or
even a priori acceptability.
This objection involves an equivocation about dependence. One
can say that justifiably believing something depends on experience,
having in mind that it is rationally revisable in the light of experi-
ence. But one could also mean that justified acquisition of the belief
must be based on experience, that there must have been some experi-
ence which was used as evidence in reaching the belief. The former
means that the acceptability of holding on to the belief depends
on the absence of countervailing experience; the latter means that
the acceptability of getting the belief depends on the presence of
supporting experience.23 We could mark the distinction by saying
that if a belief is rationally revisable in the light of future experience,
its retention is negatively dependent on experience; and if a belief
cannot have been justifiably acquired unless some experience was
used as grounds in the process, its acquisition is positively depen-
dent on experience. The final inference of the objection is, in effect,
an inference from the negative experience-dependence of retention
to positive experience-dependence of acquisition. Why should we
accept this inference? Why assume that a belief which is vulnerable
to experience cannot have been justifiably acquired in an a priori
manner?
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If a belief can be justifiably acquired without the use of experience
as evidence for it, as is claimed here, it can also be justifiably retained
without the use of experience as evidence for it, as long as the believer
has no reason to question it. In such cases neither acquisition nor
retention is positively dependent on experience. Thus there may be
justified a priori retention as well as justified a priori acquisition of
a true belief. If in addition the belief was reliably acquired it would
be a priori knowledge, on some accounts of knowledge. All this is
consistent with the claim that the belief is rationally revisable in the
light of possible future experience.
You may still feel that conceptual knowledge would be analytic
knowledge, and that as there is no such thing as analytic knowledge
there cannot be the kind of conceptual knowledge purportedly illus-
trated here. But if one recalls the account of the conceptual way in
which  can be acquired, it is clear that no analysis of meanings, no
deduction from definitions and no other type of intellectual operation
on linguistic input is involved. If we may characterise broadly the
type of input to the thinking suggested in my account, it is visual
rather than verbal. It is true that the thinking depends on posses-
sion of concepts, but concepts on the view presented here are not
linguistic entities. This is not to deny that one can use a word or
phrase to express a concept, just as one can use a whole sentence
to express to thought. But a concept is not essentially something
expressed by a phrase in a language, and concept possession is not a
linguistic ability or disposition. So the conceptual thinking described
as a way of reaching  cannot be assimilated to analysis of mean-
ings. One can consistently accept this thinking and Quine’s salutary
warnings against the possibility of discovering non-linguistic truths
by investigating linguistic usage.
7. CONCLUSION
If a non-perceptual belief in the seemingly obvious is epistemic-
ally acceptable (knowledge), what makes it so? It is not enough
that we cannot imagine a counterexample, or cannot understand
how a counter-example is possible, for this situation can arise
when counterexamples are possible but beyond our current powers
of comprehension. Extrapolating from the case studied here, what
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makes a non-perceptual belief in the seemingly obvious acceptable
is that it issues from the activation of reliable belief-forming dispo-
sitions, dispositions due to the possession of concepts contained in
the thought believed, when defeaters are absent and when the route
to belief, if made explicit, would provide a justifying argument. That
is my hypothesis about the epistemology of the obvious.
NOTES
1 I would like to thank Paul Horwich, Michael Martin, Michael Resnik, Barry
Smith and Jerry Valberg and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge a considerable debt
to work of Christopher Peacocke.
2 Meno (82b9–85b7). See Plato (1985) for the text with an excellent parallel
translation and useful notes by R. Sharples.
3 For defence of this claim see Giaquinto (1993).
4 Henceforth I take this qualification as read.
5 I am using the expression ‘obvious’ non-technically. On this use something that
one understands but does not find obvious can later become obvious to one; also
one may want to find a justification for believing something one finds obvious e.g.
to make it rational for someone else to believe it.
6 See Peacocke (1992), Chs. 3, 4.
7 For a useful discussion of non-conceptual content see Crane (1992).
8 Peacocke (1992) Ch. 3.
9 Palmer (1982) x3.5.1. Michael Martin has suggested that perceiving something
as a diamond involves perceiving one of its corners as an object-centered top.
This may be an additional feature due to perceiving one of the angle bisectors as
a vertical axis with an upward direction.
10 Evidence comes from experiments done on perception of ‘figural goodness’.
See Garner (1974).
11 This should not be confused with a similar component of the conceptual content
of experience also called ‘aspect’.
12 Recall: an object appears square to one when it occupies a square region of
the scenario that one’s experience represents as instantiated around one, and one
experiences that region as having equal sides and as symmetrical about the bisec-
tors of its sides.
13 Michael Martin suggests that perfect squareness might be better explicated in
terms of focal squareness than maxima of perceptual acuity.
14 You find some proposition primitively compelling for certain reasons just when
your finding it compelling for those reasons is not in turn reason-based. In particu-
lar, if your believing A primitively compels you to believe B, then no intervening
reasons are involved in your inferring B from A.
15 These frame phenomena can be explained with reference to the following
facts. Vertical and horizontal symmetries are more readily detected than diagonal
symmetries; and those symmetries of the figure which coincide with vertical and
horizontal symmetries are more readily perceived than those which do not. When
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the figure is set within another figure, the symmetries of the inner figure most
readily perceived are those which coincide with (the most readily perceived)
symmetries of the containing figure. See Palmer (1983), x3.5.1.
16 It would be unnecessarily wearing to work through possession conditions for
these concepts here. All I am assuming about these concepts is that if their posses-
sors have a concept of restricted universal quantification and can represent the
constitutive inference forms they will have a couple of dispositions. These are (a)
when the thinker perceives F as a perfect square perfectly symmetrical about its
diagonals, she will find it immediate that a line through a perfect square x is a
diagonal of x if it would correspond to a diagonal of F were F as it appears, and
(b) she will find it immediate that the parts either side of a diagonal of a perfect
square are perfect triangles.
17 This would not appear to be a square separated from (and competing with) the
seen square. Rather it would be a representation whose activation is involved in
recognising the perceived figure as a square. See Kosslyn (1994), Ch. 5.
18 Sometimes sub-personal transitions between information bearing mental states
(which need not be thoughts) are described as inferences. Here the word ‘infer-
ence’ and its cognates are reserved for personal-level attention-directed moves
between thoughts, moves taken by the thinker to be truth preserving.
19 This account of reliability works for the dispositions under consideration, but
not for all belief-forming dispositions. The basic idea is the same in other cases;
the complications need not detain us.
20 Perhaps the second grade of justification not internalist. But the first grade,
involving coherence conditions on items the believer is current aware of, is inter-
nalist. So the view of knowledge assumed here mixes internalist and externalist
requirements.
21 The referee’s comments on an earlier version of this section were particularly
helpful.
22 The intended sentences are those we might use individually; a conjunction of
sentences composing an encyclopaedia of established beliefs would clearly not
count here.
23 What counts as countervailing and supporting experience for a claim is not
determined by that claim alone. On a Bayesian response to Duhem’s lesson, the
degrees of confidence we have in other claims will be a factor.
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